Экспертиза Таможенный союз России, Беларуси и Казахстана, Единое экономическое пространство – развитие интеграционных
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- Бұл бет үшін навигация:
- Preconditions of Privatization
- Fundamental Problems of Privatization
- Legislative basis of privatization
- Privatization of the Enterprises
- Privatization of bank system.
- Bibliography
PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA A.V. Surma Introduction The main aim of the essay it to analyze the process of privatization in Russia in 1989−1995, and to mark out its key elements. The statement is that denationalization in Russia passed spontaneously (without certain strategy) was weak-controlled and suffered from non professionalism of the management of those processes. Analyzing the process of privatization, not only the economic side of this issue should be touched. This process usually affects the all sphere of social life, causing numerous problems and bonuses for different social groups. Privatization can be defined as a process of denationalization and divestment of government property. This process has a lot of forms and ways. Historical experience shows, that privatization in different countries caused or came together with revolutionary coups, mass protests, and repressions (like in Latin America), military aggression ( Former Yugoslavia in 1990th), social chaos (former USSR), or economical shock overcoming ( Eastern and Central Europe).
Privatization in Russia as the general economic procedure started in the beginning of 1990th, but really its roots are coming from the second part of 1980th when during Gorbachev’s reforms a “law on state enterprises” came into force. According to this statute (1987) the main principles of functioning of state enterprises were the whole self-supporting basis and self financing. In other words this law didn’t provide only managerial independence of the enterprises but also made possible the privatization of state property. Self-financing wasn’t a new issue in economic life of Soviet Union. There were numerous experiments in enterprises’ management before, and self-financing was one of them. In 1985 two main soviet industry enterprises – “Frunze production association” in Ukraine and “VAZ” in Russia became subjects of self-financing experiment. Really such called “self-financing” was just the change in tax policy on profits that created special funds and ceased the guarantee of the bonuses of the preceding year. And still there were some central investments remained, so the term “self-financing” didn’t response the real situation. First year showed good results, but in 1987 functioning and profit of those enterprises didn’t distinguish from the others.22 But still the law on state enterprises came into the force, and consequently formed the necessity of leasing of the enterprises in 1989. The contradictions of planned economy, central plan and pricing are very numerous and extremely volumetric. That’s why it would be more efficient to focus on the main factors that make the privatization rational. One of the most important factors is “economic irrationality”. The model of human behavior defines the economic behavior as well: every action has its structure which consists from motives, situational conditions, means, process of choosing means and aim. If we look at the behavior of the owner of enterprise, economic rationality of his actions should concern the maximization of enterprise’s profit with the minimization of recourse expenditure. This motivation is logical and clear. In planned economy, such motivation is coming into serious distortion. The principle of an enterprise is not such interested in a profit he will gain (because the profit coming from the permanent salary is stable and unchanging), but in the preservation of his position and different privileges he obtained from being a member of “nomenclature”. As we can see again preservation of this position depended more on the ability to play with “plan” and preserving the position in supply system then on gaining profit. So the managers of enterprises were not interested in raising the production, because next time they would simply obtain overrated plan which is more complicated for realization. This fact put the preservation of manager position under the doubt. So the whole economic actions – motives, means, and situational conditions were oriented on the aim of self-preserving, but not on the economic and industrial profit. Concerning the managing of enterprises in planned economy one more aspect should be mentioned. In private enterprises managers are interested in long-term financial profit of their business and response to the supply and demand conjuncture. State as an owner can’t provide such interest for the principles of enterprises because of lack of personal motivation for this. Of course there were some profitable firms, with the efficient and rational managing in the USSR but they were more exception then the rule. (As well as there are some profitable state enterprises in market economy systems).23
As the party-state enterprises were very specific subjects of economic system, it is really complicated to forecast their functioning in market economy. There were no any certain plans and forecast for privatization and its development or failure in the future. In capitalism the subject of economy plays absolutely different roles, carrying out absolutely different functions and had absolutely different basis of the existence. It was literary impossible to switch this complicated and giant mechanism in few years. Privatization costs too much in economic and social ways. Soviet society didn’t have such recourses, that why Gorbachev’s crew was counting on the western help. And it was the strategic mistake of Gorbachev’s reformation. Economic system of Soviet Union was of a type, that the only possibility to provide successful reformation lies in radical character of the reforms and the reformation “must pass a high threshold in a short time” (Balcerowicz, p.57). The understanding of reforms as a process is a threat to be dropped in a partial reforms trap. So the reforms should have intensive and even radical dynamic. 24 Privatization in Russia was the process that could be characterized by some specific factors: 1. First of all the institute of private property didn’t exist as such in the USSR, and of course appeared to be undeveloped from legislative and social points of view in post soviet Russia. Communist doctrine provided strongly negative image of the private property and ownership. So from social and normative positions it was impossible for the state to provide any comprehensive idea of property reforms. The institutional framework was formed in 1990 by a “a state committee on the property” (GKI – “Goskomimushestvo”) and its territorial structures. Also the enterprises themselves were supposed to form the privatization commissions that would prepare the plan of privatization, preferential variants of stock purchase and appraisal of the property.25 But still it was “GKI” who supposed to be the main “organizer” of the privatization. 2. Another factor was the shadow sector of Soviet Economy. Impossibility of central comprehensive supply leaded to the strong development and spreading of black market and non-official business transactions. Those transactions were pretty similar to market economy transactions, where the recourses were exchanged with the aim of profit. And even if those recourses were not privately owned by somebody, but definitely were under someone’s certain power, and brought the profit. So the transiting from planed economy to the market one wasn’t just elimination of all old economic institutes and building the new ones on “tabula rasa”. Really it was mostly the development and legalizing numerous processes that already existed and were quit efficient. Reforms were provided by “nomenclature”, and of course this process wasn’t divergent with the interests of Communist Party leaders, enterprises’ managers, and other “inside players” of the system. 26 3. Essential feature of Russian privatization was the high influence of political arrangement. As it was said above – the whole state institution as GKI was formed just to rule the process of privatization (in comparison in Poland there were no even a ministry27 of privatization). Of course political influence after collapse of Soviet Union was pretty much characterized by the attempts of Western States and international monetary organizations to take transiting processes under control and to gain as much profit from it as possible. Experienced “guru” of organizing privatization and transformation processes in Latin America and Eastern Europe – “Chicago Boys” – didn’t pass such giant and potentially profitable market as Russia. Jeffrey Sachs – the one who played one of the key roles in providing shock therapy in Poland - appeared to be an official advisor on foreign investment. Unfortunately the financial help from WMF and USA, which supposed to become a fundament of Russian reforms wasn’t received. If “shock” of the reforms supposed to be “healed” by financial aid, Russia didn’t receive any donations to finance “shock therapy”. Jeffrey Sachs commented that the spirits in Washington were not under ideological influence against Russia, but the whole atmosphere could be characterized as “simple laziness” (Naomi Klein., 2009 P.285). At the same the whole crew of Yeltsin’s ministers lost their positions because of corruption scandals concerning their “profitable” relations with different investors and foreign politicians. 28 Also the “shock therapy” opened Russian borders for different investments, and for short-termed speculated also. Currency machinations, money laundry, drug traffic, corruption became the part of day to day life.
As a complicated process privatization needs a high level of formalization. Soviet, and then Russian government had to adopt numerous legal acts and documents. In just appeared state as Russian Federation were no conditions for development of legislative system. There were few professional lawyers and the whole normative set had to be changed from soviet to Russian ones. So process of privatization was simplified and regulated by the main fundamental acts. Very interesting fact is mention in Anders Aslund book “How Russia Became a Market Economy” - that for writing numerous legal acts for privatization GKI employed an American lawyer Jonathan Hay.29 First law was adopted in 1987 – the “law on state enterprises” the second statute, that influenced the process of privatization was the law “on cooperatives” 1986. The decree on leasing on 1989 (when the self-financing experiment of the enterprises failed) The law on “privatization of state and municipal enterprises” came into the force in 1991, and just contributed with some norms the lasting process of privatization. The government program of privatization was proclaimed only in 1992. But still, the violation of fundamental laws and constitution was integral part of Russian privatization. The whole this process turned to the statement “that what wouldn’t be sold – it would be stolen”.
First step to the privatization of enterprises were made as mentioned above in 1987 with the law on state enterprises. When the idea of self-financing failed, next attempt of reformation was taken by the Soviet decree on leasing in 1989. The leasing of enterprises, that was strongly suggested by Gorbachev leaded to inside privatization by workers through very cheap prices. Moreover it made possible the formation of associations and cooperatives that caused such called “nomenclature” privatization. Later these groups became illegal, but still remained their existence and also appeared later as different holdings and financial-industrial groups.30 Such called new “owners” of state enterprises after 1987 provided the self-interested policy simply bringing their firms to the bankruptcy. But even if the managers were truly interested in increasing the profit and sufficiency of “their” enterprises, they figured out that those organizations were simply unable to participate in free market relations. The internal structure of firm, mentality of workers, and lack of professional managers – everything had to be changed. But it required a lot of time and resources. 31 The privatized enterprises came out of the state control what provided the misbalance and partial failure of functioning of state economy. So at the beginning of 1990 the majority of soviet enterprises were functioning on the leasing basis with the opportunity to be sold out. The public property was divided into 2 categories: state property and municipal property. If the previous process of privatization had the character of slow lasting denationalization, from the Law of 1991 – it started to be spontaneous and crumbling sale of all kinds of state property. Strict terms and dead ends settled by the government made almost of the enterprises “ready” for privatization in the end of 1991. But still the “reformers” didn’t have a clear idea in what way they should perform further privatization. The whole half of 1992 passed in a strong and aggressive debate with the main question “who supposed to be an owner of the enterprises”. This problem occurred because of struggle for interest among three actors – work collectives, the managers and state authorities. Those debates ended with the adoption of the “Program of privatization” for 1992.32 As the result the most common instrument of privatization was applied – the voucher mechanism, that was mainly suggested by Yeltsin. The voucher system supposed to create the demand of privatized property. And also one feature made this Russian mechanism different from the others – the vouchers were not personalized, they were absolutely tradable. 33 Looking from almost 20 years perspective, it is possible to make a statement that for Russia it wasn’t the proper way to market economy. But from the other side it is very doubtful that there was any other appropriate variant of privatization in that complicated situation. There were no any potential investors and the lack of accumulation of capital made impossible the privatization in any other way. Still voucher privatization didn’t manage to create the appropriate class of “owners” because the main quantity of shares appeared to be owned by work collectives. Both of these subjects didn’t have any capital for investments so the task of creature of private capital wasn’t accomplished.34 Logically next step was the beginning of “financial privatization” in 1995. It became able after the creation of bank system and powerful private capital that was able to invest in the economy. But the financial crises and exaggerated inflation stroke the second stage of privatization, prolonging the forming of class of efficient owners till the beginning of 21 century.
The bank system of the USSR can be characterized by total absence of commercial banks and institutions of loans and credits in monetary systems. State bank of the USSR (formed in 1921), was just the administrative body of state bodies hierarchy, and didn’t play any bank role except emission and setting the course of the ruble. There was no any accumulating or movement of the capital. Playing the role of a Central Bank, Soviet Gosbank had one feature that made it different from the western central banks – it was totally dependent on the government, being a kind of state administration department. Such dependency means the possession of all negative features of centralized management. Still the bank system is one of the main institutions that are necessary for functioning of market economy. The key roles of banks are the crediting enterprises and accomplishing macroeconomic equilibrium. The system of commercial credits produces the selection of profitable enterprises by supporting them with credits and investments, and also helps to get rid of unprofitable economic subjects.35 In the USSR money didn’t play a role of a subject of trade (they were not for sell) – but only the role of exchange mean. Existing in two forms – cash and enterprise money (non cash), money for household actors and for enterprises was strongly separated. That made the possibility of separating the crises and different currency “strokes” for enterprises and citizens. The reformation of the system in 1987-88 eliminated this separation and provided society into strong crises of good’s deficit and inflation.36
There was an attempt to analyze and to mark out key issues of the denationalization and divestment of government property in Russia. Also it was shown, that this processes can be characterized by lack of long term program and simple unprofessionalism. The absence of any certain strategy made privatization in Russia very complicated and suffering process for its citizens and the economy as a whole. The privatization can be characterized as “transformation of the ownership of state firms” (Balcerowicz L, 1995, p. 186) but really it was the mechanism that should transfer the soviet planned economy into the market one. In the economic sphere privatization build the fundament for transforming to the market economy and forming free market relations in Russia. In social and political life privatization formed a new social structure. A gap between worker class and ex member of nomenclature which was huge in the past became anomaly exaggerated. Criminal structures expanded and started to dominate in numerous social and economic processes. (In 1993 real income of citizens grew on 10% and in 1994 on 16%, and at the same time decrease of salary was 30%.37 It shows that incomes came not from official salaries, but from the other sources). Among the most suffered social groups appeared to be “budget-salary” teachers, medics, scientists and so on. Reforms negatively influenced on the social health of Russian nation as the whole. Bibliography
Abstract The essay is dedicated to the process of privatization in Soviet Union and then in Russia as a legal successor of the USSR. The first part of the essay describes the main issues of privatization as the economic and social process. The questions of inefficiency of state enterprises in the Soviet Union are taken as a main necessity for denationalization of government property. Preconditions and problems that appeared in the USSR in the late 1980th are analyzed and marked out. Almost of occurred problems were caused by spontaneous and uncontrolled reformation process of Gorbachev’s period, and chaotic social and economic situation in post-soviet Russia in early 1990. The second part of paper is devoted to the issues of privatization of enterprises and bank system in Russia. Enterprises in Russia were very specific economical subjects which didn’t have any experience of “self-existence”, while bank system (in its standard understanding) didn’t exist in the USSR at all. Privatization processes concerning enterprises and Bank system concluded a lot of complicated contradictions and specific features that should be marked out in studying Russian privatization of early 1990th. 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Мансурова [Электронный ресурс] // Официальный портал Евразийского экономического сообщества. − Режим доступа: http://www.evrazes.com/news/publication/view/53. − Дата доступа: 02.03.2012. 22 Aslund A., “Gorbachev’s Struggle for Economic Reform”, New York, 1990, P.94-96. 23 Merton J. Peck “What Is To Be Done. Proposals For The Soviet Transition To The Market”, Yale University Press, 1992 P. 151; 24 Balcerowicz L., “Socialism Capitalism Transformation” CEU Press 1995, p. 57. 25 Dabrowski M., “The Gaidar Program. Lessons for Poland And Eastern Europe” Warsaw, 1993, P. 89. 26 Yavlinski G., “The Social-Economic System of Russia and Problems of it Modernization”. 28 Naomi K., “The Shock Doctrine”, Warsaw, 2009, p. 269. 29 Aslund A., “How Russia became a market economy”, Washington, 1995 p. 247. 30 IBID, P.226; 31 Yavlinski G., “The Social-Economic System of Russia and Problems of it Modernization”; 32 Aslund A., “How Russia became a market economy”, Washington, 1995, P.232; 33 IBID; 34 Tukavkin N.M. “State Revolution and Privatization in Russia”, Economy of the Region and Administration, N18, December 2007. 35 Balcerowicz L., “Economic Systems. Elements of Comparative Analyzes”, Warsaw, 1993, p.153; 36 Merton J. Peck “What Is To Be Done. Proposals For The Soviet Transition To The Market”, Yale University Press, 1992 P.165; 37 “Analyzes of the privatization processes in Russian Federation for 1993-2003 period” The workgroup of The Chairman of Account chamber of Russian Federation Stepashin S.V., Moscow, “Olita” 2004; 38 The dissertation for habilitation of famous politician and ex-chairman of the Social and Economic Research Council of Russian Federation; жүктеу/скачать 0.5 Mb. Достарыңызбен бөлісу:
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