Національна Академія Мистецтв України Інститут культурології

Due to stability and constancy of semantic transitions proverbs presuppose latent contents, and the syntax of respective periphrastic descriptions remains the invariant of multiplied approaches in searches of its semantic core. For instance, the Latin proverb “mater virtutum ratio; nocet esse locutum, / Esse nocet mutum; reddunt mediocria tutum” [Werner, 1966, 69] (common sense is the mother of virtues: it would be hurt with being both loquacious and mute; it is mediocrity that restitutes security) represents a kind of periphrastic description of the dangers ensuing from exaggerations, and the syntactical structure remains here invariant (in particular as the latent pattern for building text as a deviation from it) indicating the initial statement on reason, then the exaggerated deviations from normal behavior and at last the revelation of the very norm in mediocrity. The connection between reasonability and mediocrity represents here the absolute core of this proverb’s contents. Such implicit inferences inherent in proverbs generate referential nets that are also presented with the syntactic perspective.

The necessity of actual division ensues from the ambiguity (ambivalence) that is inherent for fixed locutions as potential syntactic structures. The multidimensionality represents just the ambiguity of proverbs as their lyrical property. The S.I. Karcevski’s example can demonstrate such ambiguity: <с милым рай / и в шалаше ≠ с милым / рай и в шалаше> ‘with the sweetheart there’s paradise / in a hut (as well) ≠ with the sweetheart / there’s paradise in a hut (as well)’. In the first case it is ‘paradise’ that becomes actual predicate while in the second case predicative function is endowed to ‘sweetheart’. The first case implies concessive clause (“despite the hut”) while the second case’s implication is conditional clause (“if the sweetheart if there”). One can say therefore of the ambiguity arising from concessive and conditional decisions and the subsequent duplicity of comprehensions. Besides, such ambiguity proves still more that an epigram is conceivable only as a segment of a broader speech as its generitive register where the ambiguous hesitations can be removed (in particular with evolving the epigram as a folded parable).

Besides, the necessity of taking into account actual division follows from the mediation as the obligatory mission of any text. There can’t be any text without this or that function even if it is taken as the vehicle of general truth as in proverb. It is already the compressive origin of proverbs as some narrations’ summaries that demands the determination of such folded textual origins and functional destination. In the proverb “one should hew iron till it is hot” it is not only the hotness that determines the novelty of message. The condition of hotness can also be conceived as unimportant without abusing the correctness and adequacy of interpretation when it goes about the prescriptive destination of text (similar to Lat. navigare necesse est, vivere non est necesse ‘it is necessary to navigate, it is not necessary to live’). Both actual interpretations are adequate and substantiated with the potential structure.

Thus the variability of actual division is not something arbitrary and relative that is imported to text from outer conditions of communication. It is immanent semantic variability as the property of each text that reveals itself in the multitude of its actual divisions. Interpretative possibilities are not subjective and relative; they belong to the inner potential structure of sentence justifying their variety as the predestinated set of probabilities. One deals thus with the probabilities’ calculus of interpretations so that the distribution of probabilities becomes the definitive feature of proverbial contents. Subsequently it doesn’t go about the equal and indifferent opportunities of possible interpretations; rather one deals here with alternatives that reveal the inner contradictoriness of proverbial text. Interpretative solution determines the classificatory decision with the preference for the respective keyword: whether in the above cited sample hill or high, hew or hot would be more important?

Accordingly the locution can be regarded as the expansion of the respective keyword. There arises a set of equally substantiated versions of the affiliation of the studied locution. The coexistence of such equally righteous and justifiable classificatory decisions doesn’t presume pluralism and relativism. Vice versa it offers multidimensional classification enabling the removal of pluralistic indifference with probabilistic distribution and preferential order. As the continuation of immanent textual variability this interpretative multidimensionality of classification reveals itself primarily in the variability of the actual divisions of sentence. For instance such locution as ‘science is the lamp of mind’ implies different interpretative actualities according to the predilection of the centre (logical predicate): be it mind (coinciding with the grammatical predicate), so it goes about the target of science aimed at bettering human mental abilities; be it science, then the value of explorative activity will be discussed; be it lamp, then the estimation of the both would become the meaningful contents of the proverb.

These properties can be summed up as those of problematic mode determining epigrammatic genus. Proverbial epigrammatic utterances being informative packages of allegorical kind (as the result of textual compression and semantic transitions’ multiplication), they can be conceived as compact problems’ designations. It is the representation of problem with compact (succinct) outlook that entails the indispensable transformability as the evolvement of explorative activity of the represented problem together with interpretability that comes to the formation of derivative meanings. Such problem represents a possible plot that can be evolved from the compact representation of a proverbial utterance. The codex of proverbs as problems becomes then the codex of plots. There is still another consequence ensuing from the problematic contents of epigrams. Being an unsolved problem demanding exploration they entail the effect of curiosity. Epigram becomes something interesting and attractive as curious objects. It correlates with the constant presence of the elements of humor so that one has to conceive epigrams as the revelations of wittiness.

It is problematic mode that becomes the basis of integration, both of text and of code. Integrative aspects enable discerning a particular side of epigrammatic semantic peculiarities that can be represented as the interpretative ambiguity. Interpretative space always becomes the space of codification, the very repetitions of the interpreted utterance making it indispensably reproducible as the code’s units. While being interpreted and reinterpreted anew, these utterances become integrated as the units of a code referring to the problems to be explored. Therefore it is the reintegration of problems that gives rise to interpretative efforts. It is already the coexistence of direct and derivative meanings to be comprehended in double way always at hand in proverbs (together with the opportunities of different approaches to the actual meaning) that promotes such interpretative plurality. For instance “those who wear silk do bear sins” can be comprehended both as the manifestation of social criticism with the reproach for respective circles and as assertion of the existent social situation; it can also concern the disclosure of those who try to conceal vices under garment. In the proverb <«поти збан воду носить, покиль вуха не урве»> [Зіновіїів № 748] one deals with a plain personification, meanwhile the locution ‘to lose ears’ can refer to the old punishment of ‘cutting ears’ imparting a somber connotation to the whole. Thus problems are not only circumscribed and enumerated in proverbial utterances, they acquire vivid visual image. Therefore one can say that problems become emblems bearing in mind the ancient kind of pictorial images connected with verbal explications.

To sum up, the packed images gain prevalence in proverbs and make the lexical direct meanings retreat and be replaced with the world of derivative images. Therefore this allegorical insignificance of “words” or rendering epigrammatic imaginative core entails also the problems concerning translation. It is due to the irreproducible visual image that proverbs can’t be translated adequately, and at the same time the existence of this image makes them relatively independent. For instance, the German proverb “was Hänschen nicht lernt, lernt Hans nimmermehr” ‘what little John doesn’t learn, the old John will ever learn’ correlates with the Russian «учи сына, пока поперек лавки лежит, а как во всю вытянется, так поздно будет» ‘teach tour son when it lies across a bench, it will be late when he lies along a bench’, meanwhile the difference of the untranslatable things is here too evident. That the stress is laid here upon the idea of age can be proved with the antithetic statements where this idea is absent as in Germ. “man lernt nie aus” ‘one never does stop learning (one can’t learn all)’ or “man lernt solange man lebt” ‘one learns while one lives’ with its Russian correspondence «век живи – век учись» and ‘it’s never late to learn’. At the same time they have something common in the confrontation of ages’ differences that gives grounds to correlate them also with the French proverbs “qui est oisif en sa jeunesse, travaillera dans sa vieillesse” ‘who is lazy while young will work while old’ “si la jeunesse savait, si la vieillesse pouvait” ‘if only the youth knew, if only the old age could’. In this respect one could acknowledge the justification of the idea of universal objective code [Жинкин, 1982, 80]. Such code for tales’ plots that obviously needs reshaping would become something of the kind. This effect of verbal amnesia giving place to imaginative power attests the poetic essence of epigrammatic statements as opposed to prosaic narration. Proverbs as the transformable circumscriptions of proverbial utterances represent problems as emblems that become separable from verbal substance.

This conclusion on separability of emblematic & problematic images correlates still with another property of proverbs. In particular the fundamental property of transformability can still be conceived within another approach that comes so to say from another side of “inverted commas” – from that of direct speech’s designation. Being reproducible units of a code proverbial locutions behave as quotations (with the verve of tautology) – that’s as adoptions of a code comparable to translations and assimilations. Such pieces of speech are regarded as alien things taken as ready products to be repeated and reproduced in one’s own speech in the manner of assimilated words⁶⁰⁹. Vice versa such alienation of locutions makes them reproducible as something to be repeated. One can call proverbs the utterances ascribed to an incognito or oracle. Respectively the moment the proverbial event refers to is that of abstract place and time (the quantifiers of generality being always applicable, as in the just cited place of S.G. Gavrin). Thus the peculiarities of location & localization give grounds for conceiving proverbs in the manner of translated adoptions. Meanwhile these properties appear as the result of the revelation of interpretative communicative intentional qualities. A proverbial utterance always refers to an indefinite person and to a fabulous space where anomalous events take place: it is in this space that a dramatis persona ‘scrubs every pig’ to become unable ‘to clean oneself’; upon the proverbial stage the desire ‘to steal eggs’ results in ‘stealing an ox’. One deals therefore with a particular spatial and temporal scenery arising from the peculiarities of communication as interpretative intentional activity. This scenery can be said to become that of meditative lyrics where colloquial commonplaces acquire unexpected meanings.

It is of an importance that personal and temporal attachments of epigrammatic locutions concern their interpretative opportunities. As a reproducible quotation such locution becomes the alien object of reflection ascribed to some indefinite person uttering it in some abstract moment. One deals thus with the separated partners of communication participating in the exchange of textual products. Respectively proverbs are always adoptions from some alien person or community. Distance or proximity as well as personal attributes become here interpretative powers disclosed with reflexive attitude to these “products” in the act of lyrical meditation. All it attests the intermediary position of proverbs between text and code as the mediating mediums or isoglosses between textual corpuses that could be called intertextual isoglosses.

This phenomenon is to be detected with the just mentioned homonymous divergence of the same locution used in different environments. It is already due to the variability of the expansion of a key word in proverbial locutions that this key-word displays the properties of a homonymous bunch. That such device is of a quite purposeful and conscious nature is to be seen in the proverb <«мать дитя любит и волк овцу любит»> (mother loves her child and wolf loves a sheep) [Даль, 743]. A more complicated case is to be found in a series of the versions of the same proverb where the words can evidently be substituted reciprocally and are regarded therefore as the situational synonyms: «стара пісня на новий лад / по-новому співана = старе вино у новому місі = стару погудку на нову дудку» [Цимбалюк, 236] (‘an old song in the new key / sung anew = old wine in a new barrel = old canticle with a new flute’). Here the same words (old vs. new) being supplemented with different objects change their meanings so that actually they are presented as homonyms. In its turn the completive objects confronted in pairs make up situational synonyms valid for this singular case only. A similar case can be exemplified with the versions of the proverb <«заїхала баба в пень та й стояла цілий день, прийшов Іван, відчепив, та й тим біду зачепив»,«поїхала баба в ліс без підтоки, без коліс, як зап’яла сухий пень, то стояла цілий день»,«зачепився за пень і стоїть цілий день»> where the situational synonymous row <чіплятися / заїхати / зап’ятися> arises with the invariant pair <[зачіпившись стояти]> deciphered as <[зупинившись знерухоміти]> with the obvious outlook of intertextual isoglosses. The opportunity of derivative meaning is here indebted to the metonymic combination of ‘staying’ and ‘hooking’. Finally the allegorical image of an action paralyzed with failed attempts arises. The analogy to isoglosses can be here exemplified with the semantic development of Germ. klug ‘wise’ that belongs to the Germanic – Hellenic – Slavonic isogloss and corresponds to [глодать = Pol. głodać] as well as to [ “tongue”,  “ear”] so that the idea of wisdom as something keen arises (attested also with the idiom of ‘keen thought’). The productivity of this semantic transition can be proved with the numerous proverbial versions of the image of ‘a keen tongue’ (from Fr. langue acerée)⁶¹⁰. The semantic development of <читать> that belongs to the Latin – Slavonic isogloss is to be correlated with Lat. catena = ‘chain’ and <чета> so that the image of ‘interlaced words’ arises here, the concomitant connotations of this development being comparable to the splinters of homonymous dissociation.

It is here to notice that the very use of a locution as a quotation entails the far reaching consequences. Inverted commas as the mark for quotations being applicable to each part of a proverbial locution as well as to its entirety, derivative meanings attest here the initiation of interpretative activity to comprehend this text adequately. Here the contextual determination of proverbs is to be reminded. Together with the transformability it is reproducibility in different contextual environments that determines proverbial quality and therefore as the representatives of generative speech register proverbs can’t become closed and finished autonomous texts, they always are the quotations, the parts of something absent but presupposed with their contents. In this respect proverbs are not only inferential but also communicative entities. The fact that proverbs behave as quotations means also the impossibility to take them for granted as literal utterances with direct meanings. The very quality of quotation presupposes and demands special reflection with the ensuing interpretation that necessarily discloses the deeper layers of contents. Proverbial idioms are just such textual places that give rise to reflection and as the targets of reflection expect interpretative explication. It bears implicit contents and therefore must produce derivation. The consequence of interpretative activity launched with proverbs becomes derivative process generating new meanings. Therefore the discussed transformability of proverbs appertain the interpretative activity as well. It goes about the reintegration of the textual entity that a proverbial locution represents as a compressed convolution.

In its turn the intertextual entails also the interpersonal. The migration from one textual corpus to another means also the communicative interactio0n of the persons standing behind. With any act of migration the communication and interpretation come into play as well. Each adoption becomes therefore adaptation resulting from interpretative efforts that brings forth actually new locutions endowed with new meanings. In particular that the proverbial locutions behave as migratory elements of intertextual isoglosses capable to become adoptions (taken from one textual corpus to another as catchwords) gives grounds for the concept of the so called heptonyms where the loaned catchwords are not only repeatedly reproduced but also transformed and adapted for the purposes of the text where they are incorporated⁶¹¹. One can refer to scenic speech as the constant source for such catchwords (let only the quotations from Shakespeare, Schiller, Griboyedov be mentioned). While at stage a locution becomes a password and a catchword that are further transformed into proverbs. As an example of special conditions of elliptic reticent enunciation that can easily be transformed in an epigram one can remind M. Gorki’s “Vassa Zheleznova” where the chief person persuades her husband to commit a suicide with uttering the fatal phrase «Прими порошок» ‘take a powder’. The servants (Liz and Prokhore) discuss this phrase: the conjecture «Наверное – лекарство? …, Содовый порошок, может быть» is retorted with the objection «Сергею никаких лекарств не требуется … Коньяк соды не требует». Thus a common colloquial locution is transformed into an ominous password that becomes the starting signal for the evolvement of action. It is also to stress here the reduplication of ‘on doesn’t need’ in the servant’s comments that refers to the singularity of the phrase and imparts obscure verve to it. Another exemplification of a dramatic password becoming proverbial locution can be found in Lesya Ukrainka’s “Ruthinus and Priscilla” where such role is allotted to Ruth’s cue (2nd act) «довідався, що ваші збори викрито» ‘One has learned that your congregation is detected’. Another locution of the kind can be cited from “Cassadra” where the chief dramatis persona pronounces the sentence «вино з водою / Помішані стають одним напитком» ‘water mixed with wine becomes a united potion’ obviously referring to a known Latin proverb ‘to add water to wine’ that means ‘to invite to a dinner’.

Obviously such intertextual approach converges with that of interlinguas where the problem of interpretability arises: it is to stress here that the invalidity of literal translation as the only side of proverbial transformability betrays still the humanistic universality of images. One can ponder upon universal and all-human nature of the motifs used in proverbial expressions as the witness of general image formation’s laws. For instance when M. Montaigne coined the aphorism “nothing can cause more damage for a state than the transformations” he apparently couldn’t know the famous Chinese proverb, meanwhile it is the inferential necessity that unavoidably leads to the same conclusion. That translations don’t reproduce the originals adequately (not to say identically) can be attested with M. Kuusi’s collection. Here for instance <как дрова подожжешь, так и горят> finds the correlates of Latish <cik maltas, tiki siltuma> ‘what’s the fuel, so is the fire’ and Germ. <je mehr Holz, je grösser das Feuer> ‘the more fuel, the bigger fire’ [Kuussi et al.. N 620]. Very remarkable difference are to be observed between the samples of the respective languages: <что глазами не доглядишь, то мошной доплатишь>, <kas neatdara acis, atdara maku> ‘what the eyes don’t trace, the purse will trace’, <Wer die Augen nicht auftun will, der muss den Beutel auftun> ‘who don’t want to open eyes will open the purse’. The irrevocability of the contents in translations attests the fact of derivational condensation in proverbs and in particular presence of periphrastic circumscription of a supposed visual image as the principal signifying device.

At the same time it is periphrastic circumscription that builds up the formation of proverbial locutions and reveals its universal nature. These circumlocutions enable determining proverbial motifs that are of all-human universal origin. Thus such proverbs as Ukrainian <диво як сито, а чудо як решето> or Russian <чудеса в решете> presuppose the motif [WONDER AS SIEVE] that refers to the magic destination of the mentioned tool attested with still another proverb <решетом свету наношено> that presupposes the technical ideas of perforated spectacles and “obscure camera”. Such images are to be encountered in German tales of “Schildbürger” where one brings light in a sieve. Still another case of the “optical” use of a sieve is to be found in the verse “She has taught herself” (Сама научила) by S. Rudansky where the girl recommends her lover <ситом накрити> ‘to cover with a sieve’ a hen so that it wouldn’t hinder their amusements. The motif [FORCE’S GRACE] giving an example of a catachrestic combination is to be encountered in such different Ukrainian proverbs as <як нема сили, то й світ не милий>, <своя сила кожному мила>, <силування – не милування>. Some counterparts are here also to be found in those of Ossetia <сильный плакать не умеет>, <силу побеждает мужество> [Брегель, 1961, № 313, 311]. The proverb <дай серцю волю – заведе в неволю> enables separating the motif [LIBERATED HEART] that attests the conflict between sentiment and reason. The proverb <терпець як мотузок: тягнеться та урветься> gives motivation for the metaphorical motif [TORN PATIENCE] with the tertium comparationis of ‘rope’. The universal meaning of the motif of [KEEPING TONGUE BEHIND THE TEETH] for ‘silence’ is attested with the Arabian proverb ‘the best custom is that of keeping tongue behind the teeth’ [Брегель, № 296]. The motif of [BLIND FORTUNE] is attested with the Georgian proverb «богатство слепо, оно словно муха: то на навоз садится, то на розу» [Брегель, № 11]. The famous Latin dum spiro spero has its counterpart in the Tartar «есть душа – есть надежда» [Брегель, №150]. The examples of the kind support the statement on the intermediary position of proverb as the medium of the interaction between cultures.

These typological parallels impart dubious quality to the efforts of detecting immediate lineage in the manner of migratory adoption as to the origin of some proverbs. For instance the proverb «скоро робиться – сліпе родиться» ‘quickly done – blind born’ has parallels in  ‘a dog brings forth the blinds in the result of haste’ from Aesop’s fable “Pig and Dog” (attested at Aristophanes and Galen), meanwhile it is the universal meaning that could only be evoked with the acquaintance of the Greek source⁶¹³. Besides, one could also regard the Greek proverb as a riddle with the solution of the cubs born blind. One can compare a known slogan of obscurantism “Брось Коперниковски сферы / Глянь в сердечныя пещеры!” ‘leave the spheres of Copernicus, gape in the presipices of heart’ (Gr. Skovoroda, “The Garden of Divine Chants”, N. 28) with the enunciatio0n of Hafiz (N. 102/87) who recommended “to pour wine into notebook” as well as with commonplaces of mysticism, meanwhile it doesn’t go about the adoption. The cue of Thanatos in its discussion with Apollo (Euripides’ “Alcestis”) coincides with the proverb «набалакала много, та нема нічого з того» ‘much talk – little have’; the line “Und bist nicht willig, so brauch’ ich Gewalt” (from Goethe, “Erlkönig”) would correspond to the Latin proverb “volens – nolens”; the proverb «хто не ризикує, той хати не збудує» ‘without risk one won’t build a home’ refers to the 127th psalm.

The mediating mission of proverbs comes to the paradoxical situation where very scarce number of abstractions brings forth a vivid image. <Was in Hast geschieht, gedeiht nicht> gives already some nebulous ideas of human vanity, of rapid chaotic movements and irritations encircling the motif . In the same way implies the ideas of vegetative growth (being in particular etymologically cognate to ‘thick’) as the contrast to the preceding. In such cases one can trace also the dissociation of homonymous bunches represented with abstractions. Thus <man bringt ihn auf den Baum> as ‘irritates him’ implies the irritating sensation of upheaval (comparable to the verb <empören>). Such effects preclude from the beginning any effect of “parroting”.

This paradox itself gives grounds for reconsidering the just described lack of interpretability in regard to proverbs. It can be actually conceived as the interpretative ambiguity arising as the inversion of reproducibility with the succeeding attempts of explication. The very fact of repetition and reproduction of a proverb displays the latent problem standing behind (in opposite to transformability that unfolds the compressed contents in referential derivations). Thus the ambiguity impeding translation refers to the existence of problem designated with the proverb. Such ambiguity arises especially clear in the cases of the selection of actual predicate: for instance in the proverb <meekness is not weakness> there are at least two ambiguous solutions, that of the stressed ‘meek’ conduct as opposed to severity and the alternative of warning against the suspicions of ‘weakness’. Meanwhile the very fact of designating a problem with such interpretative ambiguity refutes the conjecture as to the absolute impossibility of translation: the unexplored and unnamed problem presupposes a pictographic mnemonic prompt or an emblem it can be represented in imagination. Different versions of proverbs given by different languages can be conceived as different descriptions (or, better, circumscriptions) of such prompt or emblem of the problem. Moreover there are particular evidences referring to folklore that bear witness of the existence of special pictograms associated with proverbs.⁶¹⁴. Meanwhile in spite of the extreme importance of the cited evidences they have not still been taken into account in the study of proverbs. It is also to add that folklore creates especially favorable conditions for the development of such pictographic capacities due to verbal fetishism⁶¹⁵. Verb is conceived to be endowed with the inseparability from the situation that it represents and that is retained in proverbs.

Thus we return to the issuing point of problem & emblem as the nucleus of the proverbial contents. A proverb delineates a problem and at the same time gives cue to its solution in representing the problematic task with a pictorial visual image. Let it be illustrated with the derivations obtained from the primary denotation of the motif [taciturnity / silence]. In the proverb “мовчи та диш, подумають, що спиш” (keep silence and go on breathing, they’ll take thou for sleeping) an allegory of prudence and endurance is supposed; “мовчи, глуха, менше гріха” (keep silence, you deaf, it’ll be less sins) allows interpretation as an allegory of discretion; “мовчене як товчене, де схочеш, то поставиш” (the hushed thing is as the pounded one: you can put it where you want) may be a rhetoric evaluation of the preferences of reticence; “мовчи, бо піч у хаті” (keep silence because the stove is at home) attests the ritualistic meaning of silence connected with the beliefs in the spirits of home, in goblins and brownies, as well as a very pragmatic advice (in the kind of “walls have ears” proverbs). Besides, it is worth mentioning that etymologically Ukr. мовчати (keep silence) is a cognate to Lat. molere = молоти [Трубачев, 1963]. Such references allow wider conjectures as to the meaning of silence as it has been testified in the vestiges of proverbial thought. It is too evident that it goes here not only about the absence of sound, and the possibility of comparing reticence and mill (not to recall the mentioned oven) becomes a meaningful indication needing special discussion.

There is always problematic core present in the contents of proverbial locutions where the immanent incompleteness of verbal text gets specific outlook. The constant presence of problem (as opposed to mystery & miracle) underlying within the latent sense of locutions reveals this incompleteness in enigmatic garments. To use here the concept proposed by R. Ingarden, one would say of “the places of indefiniteness” that mark each idiom and are overtly exposed in riddles. Such indefinite locutions as the names of problems (vs. mystery & wonder) are the constant sources for semantic transitions that represent semantic polyvalence and reveal themselves through interpretative efforts. The immanent incompleteness of proverbial text as the revelation of language’s incompleteness implies such consequence as obligatory partial representation of the designated essence what is especially peculiar for periphrastic descriptions. In the proverb “he who scrubs every pig he will not be long clean himself” the attention is attracted to the detail of “scrubbing pigs” that expresses the image of dirt and mud with omitting other features. It means that some incomplete indefinite symbols betray features of a “pars pro parte” trope of metonymy. The incompleteness of a text evoked with the effects of reticence ensues from the interpretative programs inherent to each element of language. Thus places of indefiniteness within a text arise where repletion with interpretative efforts are demanded. This obvious consequence is connected with the development of periphrastic means as the replacement of the problem’s name though it by no means can be reduced to it. Another reason for the intensification of metonymy lies within the very nature of proverbial textual evolvement. While developing a narration a lexeme discovers new components of its semantic load that are disclosed usually as a kind of metonymy in regard to the precedent because they are added and supplemented to it gradually without rejecting it⁶¹⁶. It is the gradual flow of such a process that should be stressed. It is typical for folklore where the consequent doesn’t deny the precedent but overlay it so that semantic shifts (denoted with the French terms as decalage or glissement) coexist and supplement each other causing cumulative effect. It seems reasonable to call transitions of the kind metonymic chains (to follow O.Potebnya), bearing in mind that there are links that provide the motivation of the shifts of meaning and the gradual character of transition⁶¹⁷. Thus the very mode of textual existence with its compression and expansion promotes the intensification of metonymy.

The priority of derivative meanings and the removal of direct designations mean that it will go about vestiges changing and deriving new denotations. Thus the final meaning of a symbolic or allegoric entirety is disclosed only as the limit of a series of semantic transitions comparable to a row of changeable vestiges. The same concerns the literal meaning of its components that is also a limit of approximation of semantic variability. One can say of literal and symbolic meanings as of the lower and upper limits of transitions. In other words one deals in proverbial text with the interpretative derivational continuum where the vestiges of semantic transitions are retained. In its turn such vestiges can be divided into the classes of textual rudiments (germs) that are represented in particular with adages as abbreviated (“truncated”) sentences presuming known conclusions and relics of potential catchwords. It is to stress that such potential catchwords can appear as plain colloquialisms. For instance the colloquial phrase of a table-talk <give me a knife> would become a part of wellerism of “black humor” with the continuation <the murderer said>. Such an approach to the meanings as the limits of transformability can be exemplified with the differences of a word’s meaning in different proverbs. Thus горнець, горщик (‘a pot’ from the root present in горіти ‘to burn’) attests a wide load of the meaning between such proverbs as «порожній горнець дзвенить, а повний мовчить» (the empty pot jingles, and the full one keeps silence) and «чим горнець накипить, тим і смердить» (the pot stinks with what was boiled therein). Not to mention the activity vs. passivity of the personified “dramatis personae” in both cases the very selection of collocations is worth special discussion. Порожній ‘empty’ (etymologically isolated word) is contrasted to повному ‘full’, and кипіння ‘boiling’ (a thermal effect) to смердінню ‘stinking’ (etymologically meaning primarily the destruction with grinding (Lat. mordere ‘to bite) and ‘purification’ as the consequence), the very горнець becomes an intersection of the both semantic axes. Actually one deals here with homonyms that behave as what can be called the already mentioned intertextual isoglosses.

From a more general viewpoint it is to be reminded here that the very act of predication entails the possibility of representing a sentence as a catechetic structure in the manner of [S? – P!] & [S! – P?]. Besides, each affirmative sentence can be converted into interrogative mode and be regarded as a question demanding an answer. The last case affords at least two opportunities of interpretation that would correspond to dictal and modal total questions. For instance, the proverb converted into question ‘*must the jeerers be content to taste of their own broth?’ presumes the possibility of conceiving it as that concerning the verity and reality of the presupposed “obligation” (with such implication as ‘is it real (true) that the jeerers would be content…?’), at one side, and as the question about the prescribed sequence of deeds and their results (‘what is it that is obliged and to whom?’). Such transformations of a sentence converted into question attests the transformability as the general property of epigram. Adaptation of a repeated adopted utterance indispensably entails such derivative phrases and therefore discloses the evolving opportunities of proverbial locutions to be infolded into a narration ensuing from the problematic contents they refer to.

cellule that a proverb represents. Alternative options are the indispensable satellite of a proverb presupposing different issues from the given situation. The proverb “fox is not taken twice in the same snare” implies the option of seeking “another snare” when this “fox” is supposed to be seen; “law makers should not be the law breakers” opens the opportunity of breaking this precept with the mentioned breakers; “look before you leap” is a desirable precept though one commits audacity. Such alternative issues circumscribe the inherent contradictions. This contradictoriness of proverbs is displayed within the communicative conditions. Actually each proverb is behaves as an objection in a discussion that is to persuade a partner to agree to an opposite opinion. Therefore a dialogical situation is implied.

Communicative properties of proverbs as anonymous enunciations of some oracle’s voice give grounds for further conclusions. While being ascribed to an incognito or an “oracle” proverbs betray their apparent lyrical opportunities. First of all they give plea of the existent intentions (behavioral norms) that act in favor of certain decisions. This lyrical intention as the proverbial property is to be disclosed in overtly moral evaluation and attitude. It is intention that becomes the moving force and starting point for interpretation so that as the reproducible quotations externally marked with inverted commas proverbs are at the same time objects of interpretative reflection disclosing the latent implications of their contents. The peculiarity of impersonal location of proverbs entails semantic consequences. Generally speaking the necessity of the existence of texts that would not de ascribed to any person as abstracted from authorship and taken with indefinite location ensues from the fundamental properties of language’s mediation. This abstractedness can be ascribed also to the so called epic distance (where the observer of the retold events becomes as if anonymous due to the objectivity) that entails the necessity of condensed and compressed utterances that would contain a tangle of the threads to be uncoiled in the narrated story. Such places of “the condensed state” of speech must necessarily be idiomatic and bear ambiguous interpretative opportunities of diverse derivations..

It is the impersonal intention that imparts epic features to proverbial text together with lyrical incognito. The evaluative implications usually accompanying proverbs have nothing to do with intention as they are not personified and are given as the elements of commonsense. This ambiguity of intention entails essential interpretative consequences. First of all there appears the duplicity of tautology vs. paradox as a special aspect of interpretative derivative potential of proverbs ensuing from reproducibility. The already discussed structure of catechism being implicitly at hand in each proverb, this problem gibes grounds for communicative approach. One can notice tautology (that arises already as the consequence of proverbial reproducibility) with a particular lyrical attitude. While repeating the commonly acknowledged and acceptable truth on implies at the same time a reticent reservation as to one’s own personal viewpoint that could also not coincide with the general interpretation of the pronounced utterance. Therefore also a distance arises between this viewpoint and the repeated sentence. For example the Lat. <dura lex sed lex> ‘the law is hard but it is the law’ could be used by an accused person but it wouldn’t mean that this person agrees with the accusation and therefore the comprehension would radically differ from that of a judge. Another proverb <senatori boni viri senatus mala bestia> ‘senators are good men and senate is and evil beast’ would apparently presume also radically opposed conclusions. In its turn tautology is another side of proverbial paradoxes.

The particular proverbial lexical attractions do not coincide with habitual lexical valence resulting in specific effects of semantic shifts. It was even suggested to call proverbs “paradoxical sentences” [Телия, 1996, 73]. This statement seems to be exaggerated. First of all it already the most trivial judgment that can get the proverbial quality: such is Lat. formosa facies muta commendatio (a beautiful face is a mute recommendation) doesn’t contain any paradox asserting only an obvious fact; facile dictu difficile factu (easily said, with difficulty done) also doesn’t presume something singular. Moreover a tautology as the antipode or the “zero degree” of a paradox also can become a proverb: docendo discimus (we are taught with teaching) includes a pair of words of the same root; volens nolens (willingly unwillingly) and other can demonstrate it. Another pair of samples can be found in the utterances дружба дружбою, служба службою; вік вікувати etc. The means of reduplication as the most primitive collocation are the basis for such tautologies. One of the eloquent examples is to be found in the riddle бачив на дорозі добро, а в добрі та добро, взяв я добро, добро добром вигнав, добро без добра від добра втекло ‘I’ve seen a good on the road, and there was the good in a good, so I’ve taken that good and driven out the good from a good, and the good without that good has fled away from a good’ the answer being ‘to drive out the horse with a lash from a cornfield.

The property of all idiomatic texts to be understood in a double way (as the confrontation of direct vs. derivative meanings together with tautology vs. paradox) may be regarded as the consequence of the fundamental property of word to become the limit of semantic division. The mutability of meaning is implied with the limitability of lexical unit. At the same time there can be shown another manner of such division that doesn’t possess the property of limitability. They say often of “the chunks” of speech. These chunks behave as charades, they create a certain alternative to word though are sometimes represented as if they could be identified as lexical units [Лурия, 1975, 34]. The problem of idiom’s duplicity is attested with such phenomena as the so called stammer in scenic speech that is regarded as a special case of amnesia of the chosen words, the genus of “pattering” within special proverbial locutions or the so called telegraph style where frequent separation of phrases provokes their semantic changeability. Such a possibility of reducing speech to stammered chunks becoming ultimately charades is a constant shaded satellite of each text. Thus together with tautology vs. paradox & direct vs. derivative meanings the opposition phrase vs. charade comes into play.

Any newly created catchword or a locution of the kind always can be deciphered literally loosing thus its derivative sense; as the result the locution would split into a set of homonyms. Such ubiquitous opposition “derivative / direct meaning” presumes that a proverbial text would be thus situated at the brim of the sense destruction⁶²⁰. In other words there is always the shade of absurdity as a constant satellite of semantic derivation. It is not absurd to say “to pay attention”, but it would become very singular to discuss “payable attentions”. Moreover, once becoming an absurd, idiom can loose also its meaningful shape replaced with newly appeared semantic shade. Such is the fate of personal names that have become general names: hooligan, mackintosh, jersey may exemplify such transformation with the oblivion of the meaning of former proper names. Each idiom is constantly accompanied with such satellite charades of homonymous type that remind of and can actually become the open possible precipices of radical semantic changes.

In the habitual colloquial practice such a counterbalance between derivative / direct meanings (as well as meaningful / nonsense) and those of the respective comprehension reveals itself as communicative barriers. It is evident that the idiomatic proverbial utterance presumes the existence of respective experience. At the same time an experience may be sufficient to understand an idiom partly. It is why such barriers have the nature of ultimate and extreme limits where the degree of risk becomes destructive. There arises the inherent interconnection of derivation & location especially observable in the effects of irony with ensuing semantic shifts. It correlates with the already mentioned effect of curiosity excited with epigrams. One can therefore say of curious humorous enunciations that epigrams do represent.

Such effects ensue from the fact that each trope attests the divergence between direct and derivative meanings. In allegories such divergence becomes multiplied so that not only separate designations are displaced as to their literal meanings but also the entirety of the utterance acquires new sense referring to a latent and unknown object. As the kind of allegory each proverb (not to say of fables and riddles) bears multiplied layers of derivative sense. In the proverb «верба товста та пуста» (the willow is thick and empty) the name of a tree denotes perfectly another object that depends upon the situation the proverb is used in. Another proverb “хто порося вкрав, у того в вухах пищить” [Номис, 11098] (who has stolen the pig has got the squeak in the ears) does not concern the theft as well as the mentioned sounds. Thus semantic duplicity marks all the realm of derivative meanings. In particular this duplicity becomes especially visible in the riddles where periphrastic description of the unknown object is interpreted still as a task to find the solution within its terminological interpretation. The witness to the duplicity and to its being consciously conceived can be found in the fact of irony present in the proverbs. Thus the proverb “Жупан дам, сказав пан, панське слово гріє” (the lord has said, ‘I would give a coat’ – the lord’s word warms) demonstrates the very mechanism of irony fully conceived and comprehended. It has been described with the other reasons as “shift” (décalage) of the voices within a dialogue [Finlay, 54]. The first enunciation (“Жупан дам” = ‘I’d give you coat’) is primarily marked as that of the stranger’s (the lord’s) voice, and the ironic commentary indicates the absurdity (“слово гріє” = ‘word warms’) that belongs to the common places of nonsense or the so called impossibilia. The last case of irony is especially important because it attests the duplicity not only the literal and derivative meanings but also of the “voices” of persons to whom the enunciations are attributed.

One of the consequences of such interdependency of semantic and communicative aspects is the problem of irony and humor in proverbs. Each proverb can be regarded in a way as a joke as far as it contains elements of absurdity arising already from the coexistence of direct and derivative semantic loads. Allegory in its turn presumes irony that would permanently accompany interpretative efforts. It is already the location of proverbial utterance as something cited from an alien speech that gives prerequisites for the development of irony. The status of quotation promotes comprehending proverb as an object of reflection with the ensuing opportunities for irony. Besides, it is tolerance that lets humor pass into proverbial space (black & bitter humor as well). It is to be seen in tolerability in regard to the ubiquitous elements of absurdity. When one says of ‘grasping a star from the sky’, of ‘pouring water in a lake’ or of ‘howling with wolves’ it presumes one tolerating the respective behavior.

Another side of the interdependence of semantic and communicative properties of proverbs is associated with the coexistence of epic distance and lyrical abstractedness. It is the effect of alienated word (echo) as proverbial interpretative peculiarity that combines both epic distance and lyrical incognito. The effect of echo continues here the above discussed principle of implied catechism. Proverbs demonstrate a very singular way of utterances’ location (attribution to a person). They are uttered by “nobody”, by some indefinite voice. In other words the location of proverbs gives grounds to suspect the existence of some incognito’s voice that would repeat the literal sense with another ironical meaning. Thus the colloquial locution with literal sense becomes as if reproduced in echo. That is why it seems reasonable to suggest the principle of echo as the explanatory basis for the development of aphorisms. This feature betrays lyrical essence of proverbs as the consequence of epic distance and the initial point of their development. The typical lyrical partial denotation provokes interpretative processes in the manner that it always refers to “otherness” so that it “shields” or “screens” the meant contents with the periphrastic means resembling echoing answer. The attempts to find the latent essence and to complete its partiality presume reflection already “built-in” within proverbial locution as the echo if its explicit contents. The cellule of echo as the elementary step of a catechism presupposes further evolvement of the opposition of paradoxes vs. tautologies.

Such cellules of catechetic type become the satellites of admissible transformations of communicative elementary pairs of “question - response” that attest the representation of proverbial locutions with the whole sets of derivative versions. Thus for example a simple joke can be folded up in a sentential convolution: - I hear, it resembles a known melody? - No. it is just a noise of the refrigerator ↔ what seemed to sound as melody has turned out to be a noise ↔ not each sound that resembles something will be a melody, it can be a noise. The last generalization correlates with the widely spread proverb not all that glistens is of gold. It is again to repeat that proverbial locution necessarily implies contradiction. One can say that proverbial locutions always contain some “but” that invites to discussion. In particular one can easily detect adversative or concessive forms implied behind the surface of these locutions: thus Latin “dictum - factum” ‘said – done’ implies the possible supplement of ‘(not only) said (but also) done’.

It is noteworthy that a special review of the English proverbs has shown the obvious prevalence of the motifs with inherent contradictions. Such are motifs of iteration & blockage (he that once deceives is ever suspected) – deceit vs. suspicion, of limits in time (fish and visitor smell in three days) – early vs. late, the confrontation of initiation and termination (learn to say before you sing) [Каверина, 2005]. Little differences turn out to become essential contrast and conflicts. Thus it is the antonyms that reveal such alternative statements and represent the problem of proverbial locutions. Thus the inner contradictoriness becomes their essential feature. This development of contradictoriness is included in much broader derivative and expansive processes that determine speech generation as the perpetual crisscrossing of etymological, semantic and other classes (nests) and of building thus power sets of such classes and that are themselves evoked from the incompleteness of language and subsequent partiality of each text (opposed to the absent but suspected totality). It gives rise to the formation of circumlocution, and so the partiality vs. totality as the primary property of circumlocution entails the necessity of proverbial text that would meet the demand for textual limitability and the ultimately compressed collocations endowed with derivative potential. This initial incompleteness and partiality acquires also in some peculiar cases (but not indispensably) the ritualistic form of interdiction and prohibition (taboo). Thus one could say that in a way negation created proverb.

This privileged position of negation ensues from the fundamental property of transformability⁶²¹. Each proverbial utterance presumes not only inferential consequences (as well as antecedent presuppositions) but also virtual alternative sentences that would deny the initial statement. Thus, for example, the inferential transformations of the following proverb would look like < Старий віл борозну не псує → Якщо віл старий, то він не псує борозни / → Борозна не попсується, коли буде віл (старий чи молодий)> with reference to the word selected as the actual predicate (‘an ox’ or its ‘age (old)’). Meanwhile there exists also another opportunity of building up further transformations as the alternative statements: <→ А якщо віл молодий, то й попсувати зможе / → А коли буде не віл, а кінь, навіть старий, то попсує >. The antithetic transformations of the kind build up the core of proverbial periphrastic descriptions. For instance Lat. facile dictu, difficile factu gives just situational antonyms apt for the situation in question where ‘to say’ and ‘to do’ are used as alternative names. It is important that the alternative statements can be taken dialogically as the utterances of the participants of a discussion. Then Lat. Quidquid agis, prudenter agas et respice finem gives pretext for such conversational piece: – Have You already begun the job? – Not at all, I’m trying to consider its termination / – I’m in view of taking up this affair – I’d advise to ponder upon the unforeseen results beforehand. Any dialogue being a chain of objections, such alternative transformations (together with inferences) provide the way from a proverb to a staged evolvement of the compressed proverbial plot. Thus one can say of a constantly existent background of inferences and alternatives implied with a proverbial utterance.

One can say also about the significance of negation in the process of transition from colloquialism towards idiomatic locutions of proverbial kind. While taken as an imaginary objection the colloquial utterance acquires reproducibility of proverbial kind. In particular, conversational emphatic devices presuppose contrast as the way of singling out a part of a text. It implies the adversative meaning of intensified and underlined objection⁶²². Therefore there are reasons to find in proverbs the resistance of lexical compatibility disclosed usually as the adversative junction of the objections of a discussion. For instance such an adage of a universal distribution as Lat. homo nostrae farinae ‘a man of our pastry’ = Ukrainian <нашого тіста книш> ‘a cake of our pastry’ implies a continuation of <*in opposite to other persons’>. The formation of proverbial locutions always deals with the resistance of lexical compatibility: even when the conditions of compatibility seem to be retained it is the implication that will contradict to the expected conclusion. For instance in the proverb <дірок багато, а вилізти нікуди> ‘there are plenty of holes but there’s no place to crawl out’ the very existence of ‘a plenty of holes’ is quite a plain word combination, meanwhile the implied obstacle for extricating oneself of difficulties makes it an unusual image. Due to such resistance proverbs become the germs for diachronic semantic development in overcoming it with apparent contradictions. This concept of verbal resistance could be conceived within a broader approach of lexical impedance. The most essential here seems to be the existence of a set of alternatives or antithesis that each proverbial locution implies as its latent satellites (epiphenomena). In this respect one should involve the already mentioned approach developed by V. Klaus in regard to incantations. At the same time it is to be taken into consideration that such alternatives are always multiple and virtual. Therefore they are to be conceived as those appertaining to textual inner form (in G.Vinokur’s sense).

In particular proverbs arise as the objections or refutations of some imaginary statements, as the utterances announced in a virtual discussion. For instance the proverb calm water destroys the dam presupposes the continuation *and stormy water only waves over. A. Krikmann exemplifies the case with the proverb that who works will eat entailing the implication *and who doesn’t work won’t eat⁶²³. The simplest way of deriving such continuations is to supplement the proverbial statement with an adversative clause. Proverbs serve to reject somebody’s opinion and to substantiate the decision to be taken. In this way they disclose the difference of competences (viewpoints, aspects) as the necessary prerequisite of any communicative activity. The refutation of alternative is always implicitly represented in each proverb. Thus the proverb envy has no holiday presupposes the refutation of the conjecture that an envious person could for a while change his mind warning thus before the lost of vigilance. Any proverb can be said to generate expectations as to the possible implicit textual environments to be restored and reproduced within the process of comprehension. It is here to stress the importance of adversative relation as the source for disclosing such implicit textual continuations: in the last case the continuation could be *otherwise it wouldn’t be envy. One can say of the adversative manifestation of a proverb’s implied textual environment. It is here to stress that it goes about

жүктеу/скачать 6.92 Mb.

Достарыңызбен бөлісу: