Хабаршы №3-4 Вестник

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   http//www.un.org
   
2. 
   Права человека. Основные международные документы.М., «Международные отношения», 1989,с. 134-135.
   
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   Права человека. Основные международные документы.М., «Международные отношения», 1989,с. 20-66.
   
4. 
   Карташкин В.А. Права человека. Международная защита в условиях глобализации. М., Международные отношения, 2009, с 35.
   
5. 
   Казахстанская правда, 2011, 26 июля.
   
6. 
   Казахстан стал членом Венецианской комиссии// http://meta.kz/novosti/.html
   
7. 
   К. Саудабаев. Астанинская декларация ОБСЕ включает все 10 принципов Хельсинского заключительного акта - http://thenews.kz/2010/12/03/637067.html)
   
8. 
   Первое заседание комиссии ОИС по правам человека возглавила женщина // http://www.islamisemya.com/aktualno/aktualno/novosti/1196-2012-02-26-07-23-32
   

В данной статье рассматривается деятельность ведущих глобальных и региональных организаций в важнейшей сфере международного сотрудничества – защита прав человека, дается оценка основных итогов их деятельности в данной сфере.

Ключевые слова: Международные организации, Всеобщая декларация прав человека, ООН, Европейский Союз, Европейский суд по правам человека.
Summary

This article describes activities of the major global and regional organizations in the protection of human rights as the important field of international cooperation, and an assessment of the main results of their activities in this field.

Key words: International organizations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN, European organization, European Court of Human Rights.

ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ҚАТЫНАСТАРДЫҢ АЙМАҚТЫҚ МӘСЕЛЕЛЕРІ

РЕГИОНАЛЬНЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ

Irfan Shahzad PhD in Political Science, lead coordinator, Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad. Chef editor of “Policy Perspectives” magazine

CICA: Towards a New Paradigm for Asian Security
It is well known that with the rise of Asian nations such as China and other ‘tigers’, the center of global economic and political power is shifting from the West to the East. It would not be wrong to say that the shift has actually occurred, to a large extent. It goes without saying that 21^st century is Asian Century.

At the same time, however, a new and heightened geo-economic and geo-political struggle between the existing and emerging centers of global power has ensued in this continent, making this part of the world a focus of unmatched attention and a subject of continued strategic discourse.

The continent, the largest in the world covering land mass from the Far East to the Near East and from Siberia to Indian Oceans and in between, is a highly conflict-ridden and conflict-prone region. Besides, new alignments, developments and overtures have been witnessed in the recent past, not all of them very positive.

Some of the incidents and developments such as US-India strategic partnership, Sino-Japanese row over East China Sea islands, the emerging tussle in the South China Sea, the US’ announcement to focus more on Asia Pacific region as a ‘pivot’, once again highlight the need for a proper architecture for continental security and stability. Some sub-regional groupings exist but these either are limited to one part of the continent such as ASEAN or do not take up political issues at all, as is the case with SAARC. No organization exists to work entirely for the continental affairs.

It is, nonetheless, encouraging to note that some fora already exist that can be developed further to start the desired journey towards a peaceful and stable continent. One such forum is Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures (CICA). During last twenty years of its existence, CICA has grown into a very significant forum of multidimensional interaction among the leaders, high ups and other relevant stakeholders of the countries of Asian continent. While the ideas shared from the forum of CICA are yet to see any tangible results, nonetheless the contributions of the organization are unique as it is credited with initiating a highly commendable process, even between arch rivals like Pakistan and India. The idea of CICA was first brought forth by Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of Kazakhstan, exactly two decades ago in October 1992, from the platform of the UN General Assembly.

Twenty years down the road, CICA has evolved into a permanent forum for dialogue, interaction and CBMs in the spheres of political & military affairs, economic cooperation as well as in the arena of non-traditional threats. The forum, working o the basis of consensus, has developed a comprehensive catalogue of CBMs. Considering the work already done by the forum, it would not be wrong to assert that it would be beneficial for the continent to build upon this idea to enhance and expand the spirit and its ideals.

It may be pointed out here that since 2010, Turkey is holding the chairmanship of the forum that will continue up to 2014 (meaning two terms of two years each) and now China has applied to assume chairmanship from 2014 to 2016. During the Turkish chairmanship, the work of the forum has further solidified.

The widespread issues that the continent of Asia finds itself confronted with – and which encompass the dimensions of the work of CICA – establish a quite visible need for sustainability and continuity of such an initiative. It is high time that the idea proposal of transforming CICA into a full-fledged organization, forwarded once again by Kazakh president should be given due consideration among the leadership and in the capitals of all the member countries, and efforts should be initiated towards the realization of this idea.

Such a move, in years ahead, will result in the following benefits. Firstly, the continuity – and not saturation – of a worthwhile pan-continental initiative, which often happens with such initiatives if not sustained properly.

Establishing of a full-fledged organization would provide the continent, its people and leadership, with the possibility of coming up with and working in the framework of a whole new paradigm for Asian security, based on mutual consultation, participation, and transparency. The need for such an alternative paradigm becomes imminent considering that the traditional security paradigm of the continent in particular and the world at large is visibly not just and equitable – and thus, resultantly, non-transparent to an overwhelmingly large extent.

CICA’s further development will provide the platform for initiation of regional initiatives for regional problems; meaning that not the continuity of and dependence upon the initiatives, rather interference, of extra-regional forces. It will also provide a chance for sharing the benefits of prosperity in one part of the continent, with others, which are lagging behind and need support and cooperation from others.

Last but not the least, such a step will provide a permanent forum for eradicating the emerging and non-traditional threats, which are now indeed an apparent and established challenge for the countries of the region.

Thus, realizing that good and innovative ideas can emerge in any part of the world and are not by any means limited to the developed North, the idea and ideals of CICA need to be fully supported, by all the ember countries, and observers.

[The author works with the Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad and can be accessed at irfanzad@gmail.com ]

The demise of the Soviet Union changed the global geostrategic ground in the last decade of the 20^th century, particularly in terms of the relations among the superpowers. From a theoretical perspective, however, one may ask if this generalize is applicable to all corners of the world, especially about the asymmetric relationship between a global power and a developing country. As an example of an asymmetric tie, this work focuses on the Sino-Central Asian relations to closely examine how have the geostrategic ties of China with the Newly Independent States (NIS) of Central Asia shifted. In particular, the focus is on identifying the new independent variables which affect such relationship. It is also significant to predict the future direction of these ties for the foreseeable future.

China is the world’s most populous country with double-digit annual economic growth since the 1980s in its coastal areas. China is now the world’s second largest single economy after the United States, and has become a global trading power. The country maintains a very large low-paid workforce, which explains why China is able to mass produce commodities at significantly lower cost than counterparts in other industrial powers. China’s rapid economic expansion, which is expected to continue into the foreseeable future, increasingly impacts its thirst for energy.

Based on International Energy Agency (IEA) data, China ranks as one of the world’s largest oil producer, but the country trails Russia and the U.S. respectively in proven reserves [1]. Most significantly, China has an insatiable demand for oil and it is third largest net importer behind the U.S. and Japan [2]. Indeed, China is on a “global hunt” for energy, according to David Zweig [3]. Since the early 1990s, Chinese oil companies have cemented large deals with producing states from Africa to the Middle East and Latin America. Any discussion of energy security in the global context requires examination of Chinese energy, foreign, and industrial policies [4]. Like Washington, Beijing aims to diversify its sources of energy supply, to decreases its energy dependence, and to rely less on imports from any one volatile region of the world.

Whereas, Russia seeks to position itself as an energy superpower by primarily expanding its energy output, China seeks more sources of supply to fuel its rapidly growing economy. With expanding discoveries of and access to hydrocarbon reserves in the world, it seems that China, Russia, and America would not be in direct conflict with one another. In fact, it would appear that the largest oil exporters, including Russia, are in a position to meet Chinese and American energy needs. Nevertheless, it is the spiraling demand of China and the US for this exhaustible resource that makes them competitors in the energy security arena. When other energy actors, like Iran, are added to the equation, the conflict fault lines become clearer. This is especially clear when we consider Chinese and Russia technological and military relationship with Iran, which is under sanction by the US and its Western allies.

When the strategic triangular relationship among the three global powers is played out in various geographic regions, the divergent interests of major players become even more stark and complex, as we include regional players, like Iran and Kazakhstan. The “pipeline politics” in the Caspian Sea Basin (including the Central Asia region) is an example of such complex relations among the global and regional powers, especially regarding energy security. As a newer player in Caspian Sea Basis (CSB), the US seeks to conclude agreements that have clearly weaken Russian traditional pre-dominance in the region and undercut Iranian influence. China cooperates with Russia and other regional actors (e.g., Iran and Kazakhstan) to achieve its energy security objectives, which include countering growing U.S. influence in the region to open more space for Chinese companies.

Both China and Russia cooperate with Iran in line with their respective energy and security strategies. Despite their strategic cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), however, Russia aims to counterbalance Chinese growing influence in the CSB states. Clearly, any study of energy security issues involving Central Asia or the entire CSB must include an examination of China’s economic growth and role in the region. Moreover, such a study must be done in the context of China’s interaction with other major players in the region.

To better comprehend, the nature, role, and function of Chinese policy toward Central Asian states within the context of the strategic triangle, we should closing look at the Chinese historical ties to the region.

Historical Sino-Central Asian Ties

China is a big country, sprawling across much of the Asian continent. As is the case for Russia, Central Asia has been historically important for Chinese economic and security interests. China is a proud and an ancient civilization that was ruled for centuries until the early 20^th century by successive dynasties, sometimes even by non-Han Chinese ethnic groups with connections to Central Asia. History records much conflict between Han Chinese and Central Asian groups such as Uygurs, Kazakhs and Mongols, often called ‘barbarians’ by the Han, for political and territorial control of the region.

The Han Dynasty era (206 B.C.E.–A.D. 220), notable for the enshrinement of Confucianism, saw the westward territorial expansion of the country for use of the Silk Road, which connected the Chinese economy to that of Europe via Central Asia. However, beginning in the 8^th century (Tang Dynasty), regional instabilities and military defeat began to weaken China’s grip on power, as China was increasingly confronted by a Muslim resistance in the southwest and northwest. This signified the beginning of the gradual decline of China’s power and control over surrounding territories.

Beginning in the 16^th century (Ming Dynasty), Western government and military officials, traders and missionaries began to arrive in China. By the 19^th century, foreign powers such as France, Russia, Britain and Japan had seized portions of Central and South/East Asia [5]. China would enter the 20^th century too weak administratively to govern parts of its territory, a situation that was engendered by the presence of foreign powers. During this time, China was on the defensive in Central Asia (perhaps as Russia was later on in the early/mid 1990s after the collapse of communism), poor, weak, but its people furiously nationalistic to rid the territory of the foreign presence and establish a coherent administrative system that could unify the country. In the 1920s, Russia consolidated its power and political control in the Caucasus and Central Asia, effectively locking out the Western powers and a weakened China embroiled in civil conflict. Later on, China emerged from the Second World War as a “victor”, but would not regain any significant geopolitical influence in Central Asia until the 1990s.

This discussion of the Mao and Deng eras in China is not intended to provide the reader with a full narrative of China’s modern political history; that has been done elsewhere. It is more useful to highlight those aspects of China’s leadership and experience that appear most important for understanding the country’s economic/energy security complex, particularly as regards Central Asia.

Since 1949 when the Communist forces took control of the mainland, it appears as if China has been a country that is trying to find its way. Despite its ancient roots, China “remakes” itself periodically as it strives to grow and find its place on the world stage. Ostracized by and isolated from the West, the Maoist leadership quickly adopted Soviet (Stalinist) political and economic structures. The first task of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) upon taking power was to consolidate its power throughout the vast country. For the first few years, this was done by dividing the country into several large regions under military administrative control. Next, the process of land reform began, as well as projects to rebuild and expand rail lines destroyed by the War, and to build industry. As June Dreyer points out, the Maoist leadership had two broad and perhaps irreconcilable goals in formulating its economic development policies: equality and prosperity [6]. In addition, the CCP sought to centralized economic administration (to remove foreign influence) and bring inflation under control.

In the early years, the CCP carefully followed the Soviet line in international affairs. Chinese leaders stressed the “revolutionary” nature of their State, sought to restore China’s dominance throughout Asia, and stood firm in support of Soviet/Stalinist principles in domestic and foreign affairs, to include staunch anti-Americanism. The Sino-Soviet friendship was made evident in episodes like the Soviet boycott of the United Nations Security Council (the Western contingent refused to seat mainland/Communist China) and the Korean Conflict. For China to be secure, according to its leaders, it was necessary that conditions in the country’s economic, political and military spheres reinforce each other (the principle of “comprehensiveness”), which, in turn, would strengthen the position of the Party [7]. This is an enduring theme in Chinese/communist foreign policy – that the various sectors of society and the internal and external spheres are necessarily linked and must come in line with the number one goal, which is the advancement of the Party.

Changes in the Soviet leadership and doctrine, which were precipitated by the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, would have a profound impact not only internally, but throughout the Bloc. After consolidating his power in 1955, Nikita Khrushchev embarked on a “de-Stalinization” course at home that not only evoked dissension in the satellite countries (notably, Poland and Hungary in 1956), but agitated and eventually fractured Sino-Soviet relations as well (Khrushchev’s “rehabilitations”, usually posthumously, of Stalin’s victims were especially troublesome for Stalinist leaders throughout the Bloc). Khrushchev’s rapprochement with Yugoslav President Tito, Khrushchev’s infamous ‘Secret Speech’ in 1956 at the 20^th CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), which criticized Stalin’s rule and propounded that socialism could be achieved by “different means” (read various paths) throughout the world, as well as the slight “thaw” in Soviet-American relations that was taking place, were all criticized by Chinese leaders as “deviations” from the socialist course.

As the rift between the two Communist giants widened (it would become public in the late 1950s, and by the early 1960s China and the Soviet Union had effectively split),and as the results of CCP policies to that point had proved to be marginal, Chinese leaders began to embark upon a course of socialist reform that perceivably fit “Chinese characteristics” [8]. The Communist leadership adopted three major reform programs – the Hundred Flowers Period (1956-1957), Great Leap Forward (1958-1961), and, the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) [9]. Key objectives of these reforms were to “purge” Chinese society of attitudes and practices that were hindering socialist progress (in effect, the attempt to build a “socialist man”), and, to increase agricultural production and further industrialize Chinese society. These reform programs did not achieve the success that Mao intended. Rather, they opened rifts in the top leadership that eventually crystallized into a “pragmatic” contingent that would be led by his successor, Deng Xiaoping.

On the international front, China’s leaders began to carve out a more independent stance for the country. China forged close ties with countries throughout Africa, Asia and the Middle East, sometimes in direct competition with American and/or Soviet interests. By the late 1960s, China had positioned itself as an important factor in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. And, the 1970s saw the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations, and the mainland’s accession to the United Nations [10]. The Sino-Soviet rift had paved the way for China to come out from under Moscow’s shadow and reestablish itself politically on the world stage, and to position itself to build its economy by establishing important trade relations outside the Communist Bloc.

After a long civil war, the Communists had prevailed on the mainland. They took over a country that had a long, proud history, deeply-rooted cultural traditions and many successes in different spheres. However, Mao’s forces took control of a country that was also weak and economically underdeveloped. The first goal of the Communists, an overarching one, was to consolidate power under the CCP and bring/maintain stability throughout the country. This remains today the number one goal of the Chinese leadership. Tied to this goal is the issue of territorial integrity, the principle of one, unified China (Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan, etc.).

The second goal of the Maoist leadership was to bring further economic development to China and modernize the country (this also remains a second key goal of Chinese leaders). China’s leaders, during the initial years of Mao’s rule, were tied to the USSR as the leader of international communism, and to the Stalinist model of economic development. When the fallout occurred between these two giants, China took advantage of the opportunity to end its previous isolation, and forge new relationships in support of the country’s economic development plans. Despite the fits and starts of Mao’s adventurous reforms, China’s new international course well positioned the country to adopt Deng’s ambitious reform agenda in the late 1970s. China again was remaking itself.

CHINA ENTERS THE WORLD: THE DENG XIAOPING ERA AND BEYOND

Deng assumed power in 1976, and was China’s most influential leader even after his “retirement” in 1992 (he died in 1997). A pragmatist, he was the leader in China most directly responsible for the country’s rapid economic growth since the 1980s and entry on the world stage as an economic power. Deng moved quickly to consolidate his power and direct China away from its more doctrinaire Maoist leanings. At the 1978 11^th Central Committee meeting, economic development was outlined as the country’s top priority. Government and legal structures were reformed in support of the plan to liberalize the economy, especially the urban sector, and open China to foreign investment. At the same time, China was seeking to acquire more advanced technology (computers, satellite tracking systems, etc.) as part of its modernization plan. Special economic zones (SEZ’s) were created, which were intended to attract foreign investors to the country. The price and tax systems were reformed, and market mechanisms increasingly influenced entrepreneurial activities [11]. These reforms have had the overall effect of greatly expanding the Chinese economy, mostly in the south and east. As personal incomes and household savings have increased, so have consumption patterns, especially for consumer goods like televisions, washing machines and refrigerators [12]. The CCP maintained its traditional leading role in Chinese society. But, as Debra Soled notes, materialism had replaced egalitarianism by the mid 1980s as a guiding social value in China, and the country’s leaders were directing the way [13].

China’s foreign policies under Deng reflected the strong connection between the country’s economic development agenda and regional/global security interests (this fundamental linkage remains even to the present time). While Chinese leaders continued the country’s “global activism” strategy, and even initiated a rapprochement with the USSR, more and more, China’s diplomacy had an economic thrust to it [14]. The new “independent foreign policy” strategy deemphasized ideology and featured the establishment of economic ties in support of China’s modernization program. The leaders did not care to spend time engaged in a discourse on how “communistic” the economy remained, rather, which policies would best ensure success in economic development. What China’s leaders did care about, however, was internal stability. The leadership did (does) not tolerate challenges to civil order (read CCP authority). Since the late 1980s, there have been more incidences of civil strife in China – among workers, people in rural areas like the northwest, in Tibet, and most notably, the Tiananmen Square incident in spring 1989. The Government has tended to react very harshly to these periodic bouts of social unrest, even in the face of international scrutiny, evidence that, ultimately, all other policy considerations are secondary to Party authority. This was true in Mao’s time, and remains true today.

China found itself in an opportune situation at the end of the Cold War. With the break-up of the Soviet Union, China was emerging as a world “power center”. Accordingly, the country had to concern itself with global and regional issues (e.g., the Middle East, Korean Peninsula, energy security, the environment) and work with other actors to manage these problems. However, an immediate concern for Chinese leaders was the changing power balance in East Asia, which, pitted their country against the U.S., the sole superpower [15]. As the 1990s progressed, China secured a closer diplomatic and military relationship with Russia, and embarked on a course to modernize its military with Russian hardware. China joined the growing chorus of voices (in Russia, France, India and elsewhere) that assert that a “multipolar” world would be a more stable one. Also, China’s leaders became more active in their efforts to work with other actors (including Japan and the U.S.) to bring about a post-cold war security regime in East Asia [16]. Yet again, this time at the end of Deng’s tenure, China was remaking itself.

At the same time, China’s economy continued its rapid growth, and, in 1993, the country became a net importer of oil. Given the country’s incapacity to satisfy its energy needs with available domestic supplies, China has had to search – anywhere and everywhere – for energy resources. Again, as Zweig states, a global energy hunt. Since the early 90s, China has pursued energy agreements with nearly every energy-exporting actor/region, topped by imports from the Middle East. However, the Central Asian/Caspian Sea region, essentially off-limits to foreign interests during the Soviet period, captured the attention of China’s leaders once the country became dependent on foreign oil. Despite the scramble for access and influence among major powers, most observers agree that CSB energy supplies will never replace the Persian Gulf region as a major producer. But China’s location and interest in controlling U.S. influence in Central Asia make the region very attractive to China’s leaders and oil interests.

CHINA AND CENTRAL ASIA POST-USSR DISSOLUTION

Chinese desire to pursue a large network of trading partners demonstrates a calculating response to the struggling global financial sector. Their relentless motivation to gain power could be connected with the ‘century of humiliation’ they received at the brunt of imperialistic Western and Japanese ambitions [17]. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, China has displayed their vested interest in stability through multiple measures. Central Asia is attractive to China for obvious reasons. So to take advantage of their position, China has supported the SCO’s involvement to satisfy three Chinese goals: diminishing separatism, opposing superpower designs in the region, and gaining power [18].

Geography has served China well in their dealings with Central Asia. While distant powers squabble for a foothold in the region, China is able to seamlessly provide material goods to the burgeoning market. China also serves as a stabilizing element in the region. This is the realization of Chinese interests in the region: creating a dependant market that provides China natural resources and suggestible states that will promote Chinese political thought [19].

On a militaristic front, China relaxed troops along the Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgy and Tajik borders in the late ‘90s. Also, in 1996, China sought to increase trust among the aforementioned nations by signing one of the most widespread arms control agreement in decades. On the northern front, China benefitted from the disappearance of a Soviet threat via Mongolia, which frees up funds to be used for more lucrative means [20].

China has strategically emphasized the importance of sovereignty among the former Soviet states. During Premier Li Peng’s Central Asian visit to four states, he emphasized important guidelines for future endeavors. He highlighted “peaceful coexistence, promoting economic prosperity, non-interference, and respecting their territorial integrity and sovereignty” [21]. Dually strengthening the abilities of these Central Asian nations and countering Russian influence in the region, China has supported non-Russian entities like the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to attend to events. This is seen through the international discourse between Russia, China, and the CIS during the Tajik civil war. Politically, Chinese officials have shown strong support for the Westphalian principle of sovereignty [22].

Hydrocarbons are of particular importance to China. The Central Asian community has vast reserves and with China’s growing population and demand for oil and gas, a natural partnership has developed. Of particular interest are Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, for natural gas and crude oil, respectively [23].

Chinese interests in Central Asia are received well, as they share similar values. Distaste for Western promotion of ‘peaceful evolution’ and shared approaches towards human rights issues are among the shared values [24]. China has also come into agreement with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan that express their collective desires to object separatism [25]. In 1992, China and five Central Asian states came to a diplomatic agreement to support Chinese territorial integrity, and to disregard Taiwan as a separate entity [26].

Border security is increasingly important to Chinese interests. If Central Asian countries become unstable, through say, a civil war or ethnic violence, the investments China has made in that region will be severely threatened. It would also likely drain Chinese funds, who would seek to help resolve the situation. In addition, it could diminish their market for goods. So China has a vested interest in keeping Central Asia stable. The Chinese government has taken pre-emptive measures like encouraging its border nations to trade with China, in order to increase economic development on both sides.

A major development in Central Asian-Chinese affairs occurred in 1990, when a trans-Eurasian railway was completed. Two years later saw another notable railway when Almaty and Urumchi became linked [27].

Chinese strategists are well aware of the importance of a solid financial standing to the international community. With that in mind, the Chinese have been branching out and securing relations with interested states all over the world. But most interested could be the Central Asian players, who concur with Chinese strategy furthering economic progression. The democratically-challenged officials in Central Asia find common ground with the Chinese decision to eschew political liberalization [28].

Xinjiang represents the new era of Chinese growth as the dissolution of communism provided an auspicious market. Providing the region with policies unseen except in China’s costal region, Xinjiang began to flourish with the newly constructed free economic zones and advantageous trade policies. Central Asian nations have been particularly receptive to the successes of China’s free economic zones [29]. Kazakhstan and Kyrgystan have expressed interest in creating a market economy like China’s. Without Chinese involvement, many Central Asian nations, like Kazakhstan, could have been severely wounded by food shortages [30].

CHINA’S ENERGY SECURITY POLICY

Overview

Typical of most communist states, China emphasized self-reliance (and, until Deng, centralized planning) in its economic development. Import substitution strategies were the order of the day in all sectors, including energy. China essentially laid the groundwork for its industrial development from within, mobilizing its huge population under the direction of the CCP to develop natural resources and infrastructure in accordance with its modernization program. Although China is a top oil producer in relative terms, its energy infrastructure is still in development. But as a top producer of coal, China was able to satisfy its energy needs until the early 1990s, when it became a net importer of oil. At that point, the Government directed Chinese oil companies to acquire interests abroad – the Middle East (particularly, Iran and Iraq) and Central Asia became the focus of the country’s leaders and energy specialists [31].

Since the mid 90s, China’s biggest challenge has been to narrow the growing gap between its demand for energy and the ability of domestic production to keep pace with that demand. Arguably, this is the country’s number one energy security problem. Since 1980, commercial energy consumption has increased approximately 250%, and the Government/energy sector has struggled to keep pace with a surging demand for automobiles, and other consumer energy-related demands.

A combination of factors, to include the nature and location of most economic development initiatives (in the east, farther away from the source of energy supplies), insufficient investment, and poor management of energy infrastructure expansion, help to explain this gap between energy demand and production [32]. In 1998, the Government responded by initiating a major reorganization of the energy sector, with the primary aim of encouraging competition to enhance efficiency in energy resource production and acquisition [33]. Elements of the 10^th 5-Year Plan (2001) underscore the importance of China’s energy strategy for the country’s overall economic development:

• 
  Diversify sources of supply (increase imports from Russia
  

• 
  Enhance overseas energy investments by State oil companies;
  
• 
  Increase investment in oil and gas infrastructure;
  
• 
  Establish government-controlled strategic petroleum reserves;
  
• 
  Adjust energy consumption structures and reduce dependence
  

of nuclear power;

• 
  Work to establish a regional energy security system [34].
  

The break-up of the Soviet Union greatly changed the international political environment, as well as the Eurasian geopolitical scene. This situation presented many opportunities and challenges. For the U.S. and the West, perhaps the greatest challenge has been to encourage stability and “democracy” throughout the FSU. From the Russian standpoint, the greatest challenge would be to effectively “manage” its loss of status globally and in Eurasia and continue to balance the U.S. and a rising China. It would appear that China’s greatest challenge after the break-up of the USSR would be to augment its power and influence (especially in East Asia) to counter U.S. influence. China established relations with the FSR’s that would, first, be cooperative with Russia, respectful of the sovereignty of the new nation-states, and last, encourage the establishment of long-term trade -and other economic- relationships [36].

As regards Central Asia in the post-cold war period, China pursues two broad foreign policy goals: stability and energy security. Three policy objectives have been promulgated. First, China’s leaders place great emphasis on regional stability, especially, mitigating the threat of Islamic separatism and the threat of terrorism in places like Uzbekistan, as a hedge against such problems within its own borders. Second, China seeks to establish and expand ties with Central Asian states (notably, oil-rich Kazakhstan) where such opportunities arise. And third, China strives to limit (sometimes in concert with Russia) U.S. influence in the region [37].

Regional Security

There is good reason for Chinese leaders to be concerned about instability within and outside the country’s borders. Xinjiang, large, vastly underdeveloped and poor in comparison to China’s south/east (there has been development of the region’s oil and gas resources in recent years), contains a majority Kazakh and Uighur population and is primarily Muslim. The region is increasingly important as an energy link between China’s east coast and other parts of Central Asia (i.e., Kazakhstan). However, conflicts with Beijing over the economic situation in the region, as well as the threat of Islamic separatism in Xinjiang and beyond, hold important implications for the country’s economic development and energy security plans [38]. Xinjiang holds geostrategic significance as China’s gateway to the rest of Central Asia, and ultimately, the CSB. An improved economic situation for the people of Xinjiang is a necessary condition for stability in that region, and that stability (which is increasingly tied to stability in Central Asia’s FSR’s) is a critical component for China’s energy security.

In terms of regional security, the narcotics trade in central Asia has been a growing concern. China’s massive economic development and its growing population make it an attractive target for the international drug trade. The Bulk of the drug problem stems from the Central Asian countries including: Burma, Tajikistan, and most importantly Afghanistan. Historically, China has gotten most of its opium from an area called the “Golden Triangle,” a region that includes Burma, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. However, recent data has suggested that China’s main source of opium has now been coming from Afghanistan. As of 2007 Afghanistan has become the world’s largest producer of opium, responsible for nearly 93% of the global production [39]. This is made even more alarming by the fact that the 8,200 tons of opium represents a 100% increase in production from 2005. Officials in China have sufficient reason to be concerned about the Drug situation in Afghanistan not just because of the dangerous narcotics that are making their way to China but the strong correlation between the Afghanistan Drug trade and the regrowth of the Taliban. It has been well-documented that as the opium trade in Afghanistan increases so does the influence and power of the Taliban [40]. The growth of the Taliban is made even more deadly when the Chinese province which features the most interaction with the Central Asian countries is Xinjiang, a problematic Islamic region of China. This dual threat of Islamic Extremism and narcotics has become one of the chief concerns for China in the Xinjiang province.

One of the major reasons why China’s opium source has shifted from the Golden Triangle to Afghanistan is the large-scale counter-offensives that the Chinese government have taken against the drug traffickers [41]. The counter-narcotic attention given to that region has made border crossings very costly which has resulted in a reduction in trafficking in that area. Another factor that contributes to the growth of Afghanistan’s drug trade to China is the various cooperative agreements that the Chinese government was able to make with its surrounding neighbors. Cooperation with Russia, Laos, Thailand, and Burma have enabled joint-investigations and operations have resulted in numerous arrests and seizures in the past few years [42].

Although the efforts of the Chinese government in shutting down the Golden Triangle access points into China have certainly been successful in greatly reducing the success rate of trade in that region, it has also caused a spike in the Xinjiang province where the narcotics from Afghanistan uses as an entry point. As one of the fastest growing consumer markets in China, the narcotic trade shift to Xinjiang is actually capitalizing on the move so much that while the national average increase of Narcotics abusers from 2001-03 was 11%, the number for Xinjiang could be near double [43].

The regional shift to the Xinjiang province has created a new set of issues for the Chinese government to consider. Xinjiang is home to a significant amount of China’s Muslim population. Even more concerning is ongoing separatist sentiments shared by the Uighur population in that region. While the Chinese government has made several statements arguing a link in the drug trade and Muslim separatist-terrorist groups in Xinjiang, there has been little actual evidence to suggest that the Uighur separatist groups are actually facilitating the drug trade [44]. Although there is a lack of evidence to suggest such a connection it is plain that because a number of Chinese Muslim groups maintain links with other Islamic groups in the region and even received training in Afghanistan, there is reason for the Chinese government to be concerned.

In terms of regional security, China’s drug trade problem is one that has been with the country since its inception. From the British opium traders to the influx of narcotics from Afghanistan, the Chinese government has always had to deal with the illegal drug trade. However, it is important to note that while this problem is not new for China, there are several distinctions that should be made in regards to the transition of the narcotic trade access points. The transition from the golden triangle to the predominantly Muslim Xinjiang province combines the dangers of the drug trade with the already smoldering tensions of the radical Islamic groups. This is significant for a few reasons: first, the Chinese government has already been closely monitoring the situation in Xinjiang and demonstrated a willingness to use military force to go after any separatist groups. Second, the Chinese government has made efforts to link calls for separatism with terrorism, allowing them to respond in a military manner. Third, similar to their linkage of separatism, the Chinese government has also made comments that suggest they believe that Muslim terrorist groups are facilitating the drug trade in Xinjiang.

By creating a linkage between the Islamic separatists in Xinjiang and the growing drug trade there, the Chinese government has created more than enough justification to act harshly to any development in that area. Whether or not the Xinjiang separatist groups are actually facilitating the drug trade is immaterial, as the perception is as such. China’s government now has much more room in the way of justifying potential military actions against a largely Muslim population should it need to.

The SCO (discussed above in Chapter 2) serves as an important instrument of Chinese foreign/security policy in Xinjiang and the rest of Central Asia. China utilizes this body to devise and coordinate anti-terrorism policies with Russia and other members (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), as well as to foster cooperation on economic and energy issues [45]. And unlike APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum), which was founded in 1989 and includes China, Russia and the U.S. among the members, the U.S. does not belong to SCO, which provides an important forum to China and Russia not only to wield influence among the other SCO members on energy security issues, but to mollify their own competition in the region.

Overall trade between China and Iran has reached its apex. On March 19, 2012, the Iranian calendar begins a new year. For the preceding year, March 2011 to March 2012, trade between Iran and China will reach 45 billion dollars. Mehdi Safari, Iran’s ambassador to China noted a 52% increase in trade volume between Iran and China from the preceding year [46]. China and Iran have cooperated on many fields of economics and trade policy. The two countries plan on cooperating in the field of information technology. Reza Taqipur the Minister of Telecommunications and Information Technology in Iran received an invitation to visit China and discuss matters including, “internet, software, and networking.” The two countries plan on signing an agreement which will lead to further cooperation between China and Iran on this subject [47].

Iran and China will also increase cooperation in the markets involving crafts. Feysal Merdasi, leads Iran's National Carpet Center [48]. He stated Iran’s intention to expand their access to Chinese consumers for the purpose of selling Persian carpets. Merdasi also stated, “Iranian carpet stores may be opened in three Chinese cities of Kwangju, Beijing and Shanghai in near future, as well.” Iran and China will create a shared corporation to increase the amount of marketing and exports of carpets [49]. Specific regions of Iran will benefit from increased exports of Persian carpets. The Iranian province of East Azerbaijan has witnessed the total amount of Persian carpets exported to China increase by a factor of 6 [50].

Merdasi also mentioned exports of Persian carpets increase by a factor of 12 from March 2011 [51]. A memorandum of understanding was signed between China and Iran revolving the trade of handicrafts. The memorandum will attempt to increase exports of Iranian handicrafts, including Persian carpets, to China. Iran wanted to increase cooperation handicraft trade with China because of China’s increasing exports of handicrafts into Iran which has displaced many workers [52]. Handicrafts remain a rising market for cooperation between China and Iran.

US and UN sanction remain an important aspect of cooperation between China and Iran. China’s Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) won the rights to develop the North Pars Gas Field in conjunction with Iranian companies in 2008 [53]. In late 2010, most likely at the behest of the US government, the CNOOC halted its work on Iran’s North Pars Gas Field. The Sinopec Group, another huge Chinese fossil fuel consortium, pushed back the date it will begin to exploit the Yadavaran oil field [54]. Although US influence most likely injured the previously mentioned projects, China relented to Iranian pressure and will increase the pace of production of phase 11 of the South Pars Gas Field [55]. Iran and China are also cooperating on other oil and natural gas ventures. China and the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company will team up to build a refinery in Kermanshah city. China The new Anahita refinery will possess the capacity to refine 150,000 barrels of crude when it opens in three years [56].

China and Iran continue to trade in various fields unrelated to oil and gas. The US has warned Chinese officials that sanctions will be placed on Chinese banks if they conduct business the Moallem, and Iranian insurance company. US officials spoke to several officials of Bank of China Ltd., China Construction Bank Corp., Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd. and the Agricultural Bank of China to deliver the warning [57]. China and Iran will also cooperate in the power plant industry. China will build the Bakhtiyari dam, speculated to be one of the biggest dams in the world when finished. This dam will contain unprecedented water capacity and reach a height of 315 meters [58].

China is also looking to get inovled in projects located in Iran’s East Azerbaijan. solar, wind, gas and hydroelectric power plant construction in Iran's northwestern province of East Azarbaijan. Chinese officials are eager to, invest in “solar, wind, gas and hydroelectric power plants….mining, car manufacturing, construction industries, railroad construction, and irrigation.” Ahmad Alirezabeigi, Governor of East Azerbaijan stressed the potential of East Azerbaijan to unlock the new Silk Road [59]. The Economic Cooperation Organization will also facilitate the beginnings of a rail line running from China through Iran. Iran is helping finance Tajikistan’s Metra Company’s study of the practical matters of building a rail line [60].

Another interesting story, which includes contradictory articles involves the alleged cooperation of Russia, China, and Iran on a missile defense shield. Kayhan, an Iranian newspaper first reported about this alleged plan and presented some evidence for the plan [61]. Much evidence exists to doubt the truthfulness of the story. A short while after the Kayhan published the story Dmitriy Rogozin, Russia’s representative in NATO categorically denied such plans exist between the three countries [62]. This story remains important because of the potential dangers posed by such cooperation. This cooperation will signal further cooperation on other matters like economic policy.

Limiting U.S. Influence

As has been emphasized in the Chapter on Russia and that country’s position on U.S. involvement in Central Asia, China’s concerns about the U.S. should not be understated. China’s longstanding fears about the U.S. military presence in East Asia (ties with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) are well known. Also obvious in the Sino-American relationship since the Communist takeover in 1949 is the long history of mutual misperception, distrust, miscommunication, and xenophobia, all fueled by their internal dissimilarity and divergent domestic and foreign policy goals and practices [63]. China’s leaders and observers assert that the U.S. seeks hegemonic status in the world, certainly in East Asia. As regards Central Asia, Chinese observers contend that the U.S. seeks to “curtail the Chinese presence” in Central Asia (China is worried about the new U.S. military presence established in the region after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in America), and “weaken” Russian influence, along with containing Islamic fundamentalism [64].

To be sure, China has faced considerable challenges since the early 1990s as its leaders have struggled to find ways to meet the surging energy demand. While the country has had to increase oil imports from the Middle East/Persian Gulf over the past decade, the State has sought to secure energy supplies from any available source. Still, for reasons outlined above, oil and natural gas from Central Asia/CSB remains an “attractive target” for China [65]. The country’s recent successes in opening new pipelines and securing agreements for future energy projects are assurance that there will be future successes in the China-Central Asia energy security relationship [66]. Its geopolitical and geoeconomic position in the region is entrenched.

CONCLUSION

As has been demonstrated above in the chapters on Russia and the United States, any examination of the involvement in Central Asia of either of the major powers must take place in the context of the designs and activities of the other two. China’s entrance on the world stage as an economic giant with a surging demand for energy resources makes it a key factor in the respective U.S. and Russian energy security strategies. In general terms, the Sino-American relationship is substantially poorer than the Russo-American relationship, although the U.S. is at odds with both over their support for and ties to Iran. Accordingly, we can expect to see this conflict played out in the Central Asia energy security complex, as the U.S./West works to thwart Iran’s attempts to strengthen its ties to Russia, China and FSR’s in the energy, military and nuclear technology realms (obviously, U.S. attempts to limit Iran’s influence have implications for the economic/energy security objectives of Iran’s partners).

While there is more convergence in Russian and Chinese foreign/security policies, the limits for potential cooperation are evident at times. China’s leaders, especially in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), express concern about “excessive dependence” on Russian energy supplies [67]. Perhaps the most notable example of Russia blocking China’s influence in the energy security sphere is the failed 2003 China-Yukos oil pipeline agreement [68]. Moreover, China and Russia benefit from Western investments and technology in their energy sectors. So to an extent, the competition between the three major powers has a lot to do with geopolitical factors.

Arguably, China’s need for access to Central Asian/CSB energy resources is the most “tangible” of the three major powers. Simply put, the country’s population, surging economic growth, energy demand versus production levels, and, the need to develop the interior of the country make this so. In addition, China’s proximity (through Xinjiang) to ethno-religious conflicts in Central Asia, as well as leaders’ desire to maintain influence vis-à-vis the U.S. and Russia, gives the region security significance. Taken together, China has very well defined interests in Central Asia. This region, along with the Middle East, will continue to grow in importance as energy supplier to consumers within the area and outside [69]. Based on the evidence and earlier discussion, it is prudent to suggest that China will continue to seek new opportunities to achieve its twin goals of (regional) stability and economic development, and, as necessary, remake itself in the process.

1. 
   International Energy Agency (IEA), “China’s Worldwide Quest for Energy Security,” International Energy Agency, 20 March 2000,
   
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